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ABSTRACT 
 
The Tax Relief, Unemployment Compensation Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 
2010 (2010 Tax Relief Act) temporarily modified capital asset expensing provisions, increasing 
the allowed bonus depreciation percentage from 50% to 100%. The legislative intent of the 
provision was to encourage capital investment by firms, although prior research suggests that 
capital expenditures did not increase during the availability of 30% or 50% bonus depreciation. I 
find that the availability of 100% bonus depreciation significantly increases the likelihood that 
firms increase capital expenditures, as well as increases the magnitude of capital expenditures. 
Overall, my evidence highlights how temporary changes in capital asset expensing provisions 
affect firms’ behavior with respect to investment decisions and that the market reacts both 
positively and negatively to those decisions. 
 
Keywords: Tax Relief, Unemployment Compensation Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 
2010; 2010 Tax Relief Act; capital asset expensing provisions; bonus depreciation; capital 
expenditures 
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Short-Term Incentive Effects of Temporary Full Capital Asset Expensing 
J. David P. Witesman 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Congress frequently uses favorable tax provisions to encourage growth or specific types of 
investment in targeted sectors of the United States economy. During times of economic distress, 
however, broader provisions are enacted to increase investment activity and growth in the 
economy as a whole. Two of the most common categories of favorable tax provisions are credits 
and accelerated expensing of capital assets.  
In general, firms must expend resources in order to gain the benefits of these provisions. 
Accelerated expensing has existed in some form for many years, for example: double declining 
balance depreciation under the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) was 
introduced in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986). Section 179 of the Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC Section 179) allows firms to expense all or part of the value of a newly acquired 
capital asset up to a relatively limited threshold.1 Because of these limitations, IRC Section 179 
expensing, also known as small business expensing, is generally unavailable to large companies. 
The temporary partial expensing provision known as bonus depreciation under IRC Section 
168(k) however, provides accelerated expensing for qualified assets with no thresholds or limits 
beyond the statutory expensing percentage. 
Legislators intended these provisions to increase capital investment by firms, thereby 
providing an economic stimulus (Gravelle 2004; Knittel 2007). Empirical examination of bonus 
                                                          
1 The Section 179 deduction was introduced in TRA 1986 with a maximum deduction of $10,000. The maximum 
deduction amount has been increased many times in response to various economic needs. For 2015, the maximum 
deduction for IRC Section 179 expense is $500,000 and pending legislation seeks to make this amount permanent 
and index it for inflation. Expensing under IRC Section 179 is then subject to limitations based on total qualifying 
assets placed in service. If the total qualifying assets exceed two million dollars, the allowed deduction is reduced on 
a dollar for dollar basis, and phases out completely at $2.5 million of new assets. In addition, the deduction cannot 
exceed current taxable income. 
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depreciation has mainly focused on changes to capital spending, but prior results are mixed 
and/or ambiguous. One reason prior research may not be conclusive is that bonus depreciation 
has always coincided with other favorable tax provisions (Hulse and Livingstone 2010). The 
expansion of bonus depreciation under the Tax Relief, Unemployment Compensation 
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (2010 Tax Relief Act) changed existing 
expensing provisions to such a significant extent that changes to other favorable tax provisions in 
the same period should not interfere with identifying the impact of the bonus depreciation 
provisions.  
I identify the financial statement effects of expanded bonus depreciation by analyzing how 
firms used additional funds provided by tax refunds or reduced cash taxes paid. I construct a 
two-stage empirical model that controls for share repurchases to examine whether firms with 
100% bonus depreciation availability are more likely to increase capital expenditures. 
Specifically, I identify 17,503 calendar year-end firm-year observations with data available to 
calculate the variables in my empirical model. Separately, I also examine whether full capital 
asset expensing availability increased the magnitude of capital expenditures. 
My results provide evidence that 100% bonus depreciation availability increased the 
likelihood that firms will increase capital expenditures. My results also show a significant 
relationship between increases in capital expenditures and the availability of 100% bonus 
depreciation. Prior literature focusing on how the capital asset expensing provision affected 
capital investment has not produced strong results. Hulse and Livingstone (2010) provide mixed 
and inconclusive evidence that the expectation of and the availability of 30% or 50% bonus 
depreciation affects the level of firms’ capital expenditures. My results suggest that the 
temporary 100% bonus depreciation availability encouraged firms to increase capital 
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expenditures consistent with the legislative intent (Council 2004) of this provision under IRC 
Section 168(k).  
My evidence contributes to the literature stream that considers temporary tax benefits on firm 
use of funds. I extend the literature on the effects of bonus depreciation on capital investment by 
analyzing the entire period where 100% bonus depreciation was available. I also show that 100% 
bonus depreciation did result in an increase in capital investment, while earlier 50% bonus 
provisions did not.  
The next section of the paper provides a background on bonus depreciation provisions and a 
review of prior empirical research on bonus depreciation and firms’ use of funds, as well as the 
hypothesis development. Section 3 describes my sample selection criteria and empirical model. 
Section 4 provides a discussion of the results of univariate and multivariate statistical tests. The 
fifth section concludes and provides possible extensions for the paper. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Bonus Depreciation 
Technical Overview and Example 
Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, newly acquired capital assets are required 
to be depreciated over a specified useful life. For tax purposes, capital assets are generally 
depreciated using the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS). MACRS 
specifies the recovery period and annual depreciation percentages for delineated asset classes. 
For example, an asset with a five year recovery period deducts 40% of its undepreciated value 
(adjusted basis) each year under MACRS double declining-balance depreciation. A newly 
acquired asset, however, is subject to either the half-year, mid-quarter, or mid-month 
conventions. For the sake of simplicity, I discuss only the half-year convention hereafter. The 
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half-year convention states, in effect, that all assets are deemed to have been placed in service in 
the middle of the fiscal year and thus, only half of the current year depreciation is applied. Thus, 
for the aforementioned five year asset, the first year’s depreciation is equal to 20% of the 
adjusted basis of the asset. Bonus depreciation interacts with MACRS depreciation by reducing 
the adjusted basis of an asset by the applicable statutory percentage prior to the calculation of 
MACRS depreciation. Thus, if a five year asset costing $1,000 were placed in service in a year 
where bonus depreciation with a 50% statutory rate was available, $500 of bonus depreciation is 
deducted then 20% of the remaining $500 of basis is deducted, resulting in a total depreciation 
deduction of $600 in the current year. Based on this example, it is evident that bonus 
depreciation has a far greater impact on longer-lived assets and that the effects of bonus 
depreciation may be substantial to corporations.2 In terms of tax effects, a firm with a marginal 
tax rate of 35% reduces its taxes by $70 by placing the above asset in service in a year with no 
allowable bonus depreciation. In a year with 50% bonus depreciation, the firm’s tax reduction 
rises to $210, and with 100% bonus depreciation, the firm’s tax reduction is $350. 
As a response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent economic 
downturn in the U.S., Congress enacted the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002. In 
addition to various tax credits and favorable tax provisions, this legislation introduced a new 
accelerated expensing provision referred to as bonus depreciation. The initial implementation of 
bonus depreciation allowed for a 30% first-year depreciation allowance on “new qualified 
property acquired after September 11, 2001, and placed into service no later than December 31, 
2004,” (Guenther 2012, 7). The legislation also allowed firms to elect to forgo bonus 
depreciation for individual classes of assets, which allows managers discretion over the short- 
                                                          
2 Methods for depreciating capital assets are detailed in IRC Section 167 and Section 168 and in IRS Publication 
946. 
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and long-term effects of accelerated expensing. The 30% allowance was later increased to 50% 
and extended for certain qualified property until the end of 2005. In 2008, 50% bonus 
depreciation was reinstated by Congress as part of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. The 
Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008 introduced a provision that enabled firms to exchange their 
bonus depreciation allowance “for a refundable tax credit equal to the lesser of $30 million or 
6% of the sum of any research and AMT credits that could be carried forward from tax years 
before 2006” (Guenther 2012, 7).  
Various other legislation extended 50% bonus depreciation through December 31, 2011. In 
addition to extending 50% bonus depreciation through December 31, 2012, the Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Compensation Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 increased the 
bonus depreciation allowance to “100% for qualified property acquired after September 8, 2010, 
and placed in service before January 1, 2012” (Guenther 2012, 7). The period of 100% bonus 
depreciation also eliminated the research credit option, but the overall $30 million or 6% 
limitation on credit usage remained in effect for the AMT credit alternative. The 2010 Tax Relief 
Act also allowed firms to elect 50% bonus depreciation on individual asset classes in addition to 
the election to forgo bonus depreciation altogether. Table 1 lists legislation enacting or extending 
bonus depreciation, the applicable dates and percentages, and the availability of a credit 
alternative.  
Insert Table 1 here 
Prior Research 
House and Shapiro (2008) present a general macroeconomic theory underlying the benefits 
of temporary investment tax incentives. Firms seek to maximize the present discounted value of 
profits, thus, investment decisions are intrinsically forward-looking. Therefore a short-term tax 
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incentive that affects long-lived capital assets should increase capital investment in the short 
term. “As such, the benefits from investment are anchored by future, long-run considerations. As 
long as the far future is only mildly influenced by temporary policies, the benefit to any given 
investment is largely independent of short-run considerations” (House and Shapiro 2008, 740). 
The author’s econometric analysis confirms the theory. When considering long-lived assets, 
those with a 20 year life or more, they show a substitution effect between assets that qualify for 
bonus depreciation and those that do not qualify. Rather than increasing capital spending, their 
analysis suggests substitution through a shift in the timing of asset purchases, rather than a 
current increase with a future decrease in capital investment. The model presented by House and 
Shapiro (2008, 740) is, however, limited to long-lived assets. They state that “the approximations 
are less accurate and potentially quite misleading for long-lasting changes in policy or for capital 
that depreciates rapidly.”    
Cohen et al. (2002) conclude that the temporary availability of bonus depreciation could 
substantially increase firms’ incentives to invest through a reduction in their user cost of capital. 
They present the following time variant user cost of capital model to support their theory: 
Cs = ps Ts [(ρ + δ)+(Γs+1 – Γs) / (1 - Γs)], where:  Ts = (1 - Γs) / (l - τ) and Γs =  τ Zs 
Cs is the user cost of capital in year s, ps denotes the price of new capital goods, E(Δp/p), in year 
s. τ is the corporate marginal income tax rate, Zs is the present value of depreciation allowances 
per dollar invested in year s, ρ is the nominal after-tax cost of funds (debt plus equity), and δ is 
the rate of physical depreciation. Reductions to the user cost of capital could be offset by internal 
adjustment costs which would reduce the value of the incentive. Similar to House and Shapiro 
(2008), Cohen et al. (2002) propose that the temporary nature of bonus depreciation, or any 
investment tax incentive for that matter, is what leads to the largest benefit. Unlike 50% bonus 
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depreciation, which has been added to the annual tax extenders bill, 100% bonus depreciation 
was available only for a limited time during 2010 and 2011. 
Cohen and Cummins (2006) follow up on the theoretical model provided in Cohen et al. 
(2002) by evaluating the capital expenditure patterns of firms using a difference-in-difference 
framework to compare the periods before, during, and after the availability of bonus 
depreciation. Their results suggest “only a very limited impact of partial expensing on 
investment spending, if any,” (Cohen and Cummins 2006, 20). They also review a sample of tax 
returns and find a lower than expected usage of bonus depreciation. Finally, they review survey 
data that indicates that the investment decisions of only a small portion of firms were affected by 
the availability of bonus depreciation. 
Hulse and Livingstone (2010) rely on the theory presented in Cohen et al. (2002) as the basis 
for their analysis of the effects of bonus depreciation enacted in 2002 and 2003 on capital 
expenditures. Their model, based on Shin and Kim (2002), controls for determinants of capital 
expenditures. Their results offer limited support for bonus depreciation stimulating capital 
spending but the results do not hold in supplemental analysis. Rather than looking at the effects 
on capital expenditures, Knittel (2007) analyzes bonus depreciation usage by corporations. For 
2002 through 2004 he shows that 54 to 61 percent of C corporations utilized bonus depreciation. 
He states that one reason for the lower than expected uptake by firms could be the presence of 
current and past NOLs that limit the benefits of the provision. He also shows substantial industry 
clustering with 53.4% of firms in the Manufacturing, Wholesale, or Utilities industrial 
classifications using bonus depreciation. 
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Cash Flow Usage 
Prior Research 
Finance theory predicts that firms with few attractive investment opportunities will distribute 
excess cash flows to investors through dividends or share repurchases. Jagannathan et al. (2000) 
analyze the increase of open-market share repurchases between 1985 and 1996. They state that 
share repurchases are a complement to, rather than a replacement for, dividend payments. They 
find that firms with more volatile cash flows tend to repurchase shares and those firms have 
lower cash flows following repurchases than dividend-increasing firms. They conclude that 
“dividends are paid out of sustainable cash flows while repurchases are paid out of temporary 
cash flows,” (Jagannathan et al. 2000, 382). 
Guay and Harford (2000) use a sample of firms that either increase their quarterly dividend 
payouts or announce stock repurchases to compare the cash flow permanence between firms 
doing one or the other. They find that firms with a transient positive shock to cash flows use the 
additional funds for share repurchases whereas dividend-increasing firms’ cash flow shocks have 
a higher permanent component. 
Firm characteristics do, however, play a role in determining how firms use funds provided by 
positive shocks to cash flows. Blanchard et al. (1994) analyze a small sample of firms that 
received cash windfalls from legal actions. Using Tobin’s Q as a benchmark, they evaluate how 
firms with a low Q, indicating limited investment opportunities, use the funds from cash 
windfalls where the additional funds did not change their marginal Q. Contrary to the previously 
stated theory, “the managers of these firms choose to keep the cash windfall inside the firm 
rather than distribute it to investors in the form of dividends, share repurchases, or debt 
reduction” (Blanchard et al. 1994). 
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Blouin and Krull (2009) analyze how firms used funds repatriated under the provisions of the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA 2004). The AJCA 2004 provided a one-time 85% 
dividends received deduction on funds repatriated by multinational corporations from their 
foreign subsidiaries. Consistent with the findings of prior cash flow use of funds research, they 
find that repatriating firms increased repurchases of both stock and debt relative to non-
repatriating firms. 
As with shareholder payouts, capital investment decisions have demonstrated effects on stock 
prices. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) determine that there is a significant positive 
relationship between capital expenditure changes and excess stock returns for industrial firms. 
However, for utility firms, they find no relationship. These findings are related to the market’s 
perception that industrial firms are more likely to have investment opportunities with a positive 
net present value. Chung et al. (1998) show that stock price reactions to capital expenditure 
announcements depends on the market’s perception of the quality of the firm’s investment 
opportunities. They use Tobin’s Q as a benchmark for determining investment opportunities and 
show that high Q firms that increase capital expenditures exhibit positive stock returns, while 
low Q firms exhibit the opposite. Titman et al. (2004) demonstrate a negative five-year stock 
return for firms that substantially increase capital investment when they have greater discretion, 
which they describe as firms with high cash flows and low debt ratios. They control for many 
risk factors and firm characteristics and come to the conclusion that the negative stock returns 
after investment increases are independent of those risk factors. The method of financing for 
capital investments and the presence of information asymmetry can also impact market reaction, 
as shown by Morellec and Schürhoff (2011). They show that firms can use positive private 
information to signal to investors that they have good investment prospects. They also show that 
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asymmetric information also leads firms to speed up investment. Aktas et al. (2015), show that 
there is an optimal level of working capital and that firms which use excess working capital for 
corporate investments exhibit superior performance. 
Hypothesis Development 
Financial theory and the majority of research into the use of funds from positive abnormal 
cash flows show that firms use these funds for shareholder distributions (Barth and Kasznik 
1999; Guay and Harford 2000; Skinner 2008; Blouin and Krull 2009). Research on the 
effectiveness of bonus depreciation provisions in stimulating capital investment, which was the 
legislative intent of the provisions, has shown mixed results (Knittel 2007; Billings et al. 2008; 
Edgerton 2010; Hulse and Livingstone 2010; Zwick and Mahon 2014). Firms that take advantage 
of bonus depreciation can substantially reduce tax expenditures in the year of investment, 
thereby creating temporary positive cash flows. It can be inferred from this that firms may use 
excess cash provided by this tax incentive for shareholder payouts. Anecdotal evidence, 
presented in Appendix A, also indicates that firms use additional funds from reduced cash tax 
expenditures for the repurchase of stock. The highlighted cells show a large increase in share 
repurchases coupled with large tax refunds and a large decrease in tax liability. Theory suggests 
that firms are more likely to repurchase shares than increase dividend payouts due to the 
transitory nature of the increase in cash flows. On the contrary, firms could use those funds 
internally as found in Blanchard et al. (1994). As such, the econometric model employed 
controls for share repurchases. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: The availability of 100% bonus depreciation will increase the likelihood that firms will 
increase capital expenditures. 
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Firm behavior and responses to different income tax provisions are influenced by firm level 
tax policies (Blouin and Krull 2009; Albring et al. 2011a; Park 2012; Inger 2014), investor level 
tax policies (Campbell et al. 2013), and by a firm’s capital structure (Blouin and Krull 2009; 
Albring et al. 2011b). Funds used internally for bonus depreciation eligible capital expenditures 
would substantially decrease taxes payable, which could incentivize firms to spend more on 
eligible capital investments. Investment tax incentives encourage specific behaviors, but many 
cases show that firms have found ways to subvert the legislative intent of those incentives. Prior 
research is ambiguous about actual increases to capital expenditures, thus it is important to 
address the changes in investment in addition to the likelihood of increases. This leads to my 
second hypothesis: 
H2: The availability of 100% bonus depreciation will be positively related to increases in 
the magnitude of capital expenditures. 
Market reactions to capital expenditure changes depend on many factors including 
investment opportunities (Chung et al. 1998), industry (McConnell and Muscarella 1985), firm 
information environment (Morellec and Schürhoff 2011), business environment (Titman et al. 
2004), and working capital management (Aktas et al. 2015). Bonus depreciation creates a 
substantial incentive for firms to increase capital expenditures, even when positive net present 
value investments may not be available. This could lead to overinvestment in capital assets over 
long periods of time due to the immediate tax benefits. The 100% bonus depreciation provision, 
however, was only available for a short window, which substantially increases its benefits. The 
temporary nature of the provision and the magnitude of tax benefits lead me to the following 
hypothesis: 
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H3: Firms that increase capital expenditures during the availability of 100% bonus 
depreciation will have positive cumulative abnormal stock returns. 
3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample Selection 
To empirically evaluate the impact of bonus depreciation availability on the likelihood of 
firms increasing capital expenditures, I identify U.S. firms in Compustat from January 1, 2006 to 
December 31, 2012 with available data to calculate capital expenditures, share repurchases, 
effective tax rates, and control variables. My sample includes three time periods: 2006-2007 does 
not allow bonus depreciation, 2008-2010 and 2012 allow 50% bonus depreciation, and 100% 
bonus depreciation is available in 2010-2011. Due to midyear changes in bonus depreciation 
availability during 2010, I eliminate non-calendar year-end firms from the sample. With these 
restrictions, I obtain an initial sample of 43,746 firm-year observations. Consistent with prior 
literature, I exclude firms in the financial and utility industries (SIC codes 4900-4949 and 6000-
6999) because financial structures of financial services firms differ and utility firms face 
additional regulatory requirements (Campbell et al. 2013; Brockman et al. 2008; Jagannathan et 
al. 2000). After eliminating firms with missing observations to estimate the empirical model, and 
firms with total assets under $1 million, the final sample consists of 17,503 firm-year 
observations for 4,084 unique firms. Table 2 Panel A summarizes the sample selection criteria. 
Panel B reports the industry breakdown based on the Fama-French 12 industry classifications 
(French 2014). The sample includes a diverse cross-section of industries, with some industry 
clustering with four industries – Manufacturing; Business Equipment; Healthcare and Medical 
Equipment, and Other. The four aforementioned industries account for 67.78% of the total 
sample.  
13 
 
 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
Research Design - Capital Expenditure Logistic Model 
I first examine whether firms used cash freed up from decreased income tax expense from 
bonus depreciation availability to increase capital expenditures to test H1. To test whether firms 
are more likely to increase capital expenditures as a result of the availability of 100% bonus 
depreciation, I define my variables using the model in Campbell et al. (2013). I then construct a 
two-stage Heckman (1979) model (Blouin and Krull 2009; Jackson et al. 2009; Lennox et al. 
20113) to control for stock repurchase activity, using an indicator for whether a firm is below or 
above the median of net stock repurchases (MRep). For the first stage, I utilize the predictive 
models in Jagannathan et al. (2000) and Brockman et al. (2008) to estimate the following probit 
model:  
MRep = β0 + β1B100 + β2B50+ β3ΔCapEx +β4Size + β5OpInc + β6NopInc + β7StdOIRat 
+ β8LagDIV + β9Avg + β10PYavg + β11TOBINSQ + β12SPRtn + Industry Fixed Effects + ε 
                   (1) 
First Stage Variables 
The dependent variable in the first stage is MRep, which is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
firm has above median net share repurchases and zero otherwise. NetSTK is used to construct 
MRep and is defined as stock repurchases less stock issuances scaled by total stockholders’ 
equity. B100 is an indicator variable equal to one for years when 100% bonus depreciation is 
available (i.e., 2010 and 2011), and zero otherwise. I also include the change in capital 
expenditures ΔCapEx where capital expenditures are measured as capital expenditures from the 
statement of cash flows scaled by prior year total assets, and change in capital expenditures is 
                                                          
3 Results of the second-stage regressions are qualitatively similar when not using the Inverse Mills Ratio from the 
Heckman selection model. 
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measured from year t-1 to year t. Consistent with prior literature, control variables are calculated 
as three-year averages, from year t-3 to year t-1, to decrease yearly variation in the independent 
variables except as otherwise noted (Jagannathan et al. 2000; Brockman et al. 2008). I include 
Size, calculated as the log of total assets. Operating income is included in the model to control 
for permanent cash flows. OpInc is the average ratio of operating income to total assets. Non-
operating income, NopInc, controls for temporary cash flows and is calculated as the average 
ratio of non-operating income to total assets. I control for volatility of cash flows by including 
the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income to total assets measured over the five 
years from year t-4 to year t, StdOIRat.4 The variable LagDIV is calculated as the prior year’s 
ratio of total dividends to net income available to common shareholders. I also control for 
underpricing with the variable Avg. Avg is defined as the mean market return of a firm’s stock 
calculated using the Compustat Securities monthly total returns for the current year. The variable 
PYavg is calculated as the mean market return of a firm’s stock using the Compustat Securities 
monthly total returns for the prior year. TOBINSQ is calculated as the market value of assets 
scaled by prior year total assets and is included in the model to control for growth opportunities. 
SPRtn is the annual return on the S&P500 and is included to control for market level effects. 
Industry Fixed Effects are controlled for using indicator variables for each of the Fama-French 
industries. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
First Stage Results 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3, Panel A for firms that increased stock 
repurchases and firms that did not increase stock repurchases, and provides a Mann-Whitney 
Wilcoxon test of differences between groups. Table 3 indicates that in 8,604 firm years, stock 
                                                          
4 I require data availability in a minimum of three out of five years. 
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repurchases increased during the sample period with a mean increase of 3.66% of stockholders’ 
equity while 8,899 firm years had no increase, or had a decrease in stock repurchases with a 
mean decrease of -3.65%. There is no significant difference in the percentage of firm years that 
increase stock repurchases and those that don’t while 100% bonus depreciation is available. In 
contrast, a higher percentage of firm years with no increased stock repurchases have 50% bonus 
depreciation available. Specifically, 26.96% of increasing firm years have 100% bonus 
depreciation available, while 59.44% of non-increasing firm years have 50% bonus depreciation 
availability. Firms that increase stock repurchases are significantly smaller with mean total assets 
of $3,093.59 million. The average operating income of firms that increase share repurchases is 
not significantly different between increasing and non-increasing firms. Mean non-operating 
income is also not significantly different between increasing and non-increasing firms. The prior 
year dividend payout ratio for non-increasing firms was significantly higher with a mean of 
14.05%. Firms with an increase in repurchases had significantly lower average annual stock 
returns and prior-year stock returns with a mean of 0.0305% and 1.8029%, respectively. 
Descriptive statistics for the full sample are reported in Panel B of Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Table 4 reports the results of the probit regressions on the likelihood of firms having above 
median share repurchases from equation (1). I estimate the regression for the full sample period 
in Column (1), then for four comparative periods based on the different levels of bonus 
depreciation. The first subsample, reported in Column (2), is for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2010 
to 2011; the former period had no allowable bonus depreciation and the latter allowed 100% 
bonus depreciation. The second subsample is comprised of years where either 50% or 100% 
bonus depreciation was allowed and is reported in Column (3). The third subsample, reported in 
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Column (4), is for the years 2006 to 2010, and the year 2012, which is comprised of years with 
either no allowable bonus depreciation or 50% bonus depreciation as defined earlier. The final 
subsample, reported in Column (5) is identical to that of Column (3).  
Insert Table 4 here 
The results of the first stage probit regression give insight into factors influencing share 
repurchasing behavior. In years with allowable 100% bonus depreciation, the coefficient on 
B100 is positive and significant (β1 = 0.0853; p<0.01) in Column (1), indicating a higher 
likelihood of firms having above median share repurchases in that period. B100 remains positive 
and significant when compared only to years with no available bonus depreciation (β1 = 0.2242; 
p<0.01) in Column (2) and is negative and significant (β1 = -0.0520; p=0.0351) when compared 
directly to periods with 50% bonus depreciation in Column (3). Similarly, B50 has positive and 
significant coefficients in Columns (1) (β2 = 0.0705; p<0.01) and (4) (β2 = 0.2034; p<0.01). 
When comparing 50% bonus depreciation directly to the 100% bonus depreciation period in 
Column (5), there is a significant negative coefficient (β2 = -0.2202; p<0.01) which indicates a 
lower likelihood for firms to have above median repurchases. The coefficient on ΔCapEx is 
negative but not significant for the full sample in Column (1) and is not significant in the 
remaining subsamples. This result indicates that changes in capital expenditures may have little 
impact on whether a firm has above median share repurchases.  
Size is negative and significant in the full sample (β4 = -0.0491; p<0.01) and across all 
subsamples. This result is consistent with prior literature (Redding 1997) which indicates that 
larger firms are more likely to use dividends for shareholder payouts than share repurchases. 
OpInc is negative and significant for the full sample reported in Column (1) (β5 = -0.0491; 
p<0.01) and remains negative and significant across all subsamples which is consistent with the 
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results of Jagannathan et al. (2000). NopInc is negative and significant for the full sample in 
Column (1) (β6 = -0.9398; p<0.01) and remains negative through the subsamples, but is not 
significant in Column (2). The coefficient on stdOIRAT is negative and highly significant in the 
full sample (β7 = -0.1726; p<0.01) in Column (1) and across all subsamples. This indicates that 
firms with large variations in operating income are less likely to have above median share 
repurchases. The coefficient on lagDIV is negative across all regressions, but is only significant 
(β8 = -0.0542; p=0.0431) in Column (2).  
The coefficient on the firms’s average stock return (Avg) is positive and significant (β9 = 
0.0040; p=0.0316) in the full sample, and is positive and significant in comparisons between no 
bonus depreciation availability and 50% or 100% bonus eras in Columns (2) (β9 = 0.0124; 
p<0.01) and (4) (β9 = 0.0056; p<0.01). The coefficient on Avg is negative and significant (β9 = -
0.0044; p=0.0409) in Column (3). The variation between subsample time periods is indicative of 
disparate share repurchase strategies in relation to market volatility. The coefficient on PYAvg is 
negative and significant in the full sample in Column (1) (β10 = -0.0036; p=0.0276) and is 
negative and significant across all subsamples with the exception of Column (2) where it is not 
significant. This indicates that when prior year stock returns are lower, firms are more likely to 
have higher share repurchases. Tobin’s Q is positive and significant in the full sample reported in 
Column (1) (β11 = 0.0132; p<0.01) and remains positive across all subsamples but is marginally 
significant in Column (3) and not significant in Column (5). The coefficient on SPRtn is negative 
and significant (β12 =  -5.3669; p<0.01) in the full sample and remains negative and significant 
across all subsamples. This shows that when the market is increasing, share repurchases tend to 
be below the median across this sample. 
Second Stage Variables 
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From the first stage, I calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) and include it in the second 
stage. I then estimate the following equation using logistic regression: 
Pr(CapEx) = α0 + α1B100 + α2B50+ α3MRep + α4CF + α5ΔCash + α6 ΔDebt + 
α7TOBINSQ + α8DivYld + α9Size + α10IMR + α11GDP + Industry Fixed Effects + ε     
                (2) 
Detailed definitions of the dependent and independent variables from the first stage are provided 
in Appendix B. 
I include CapEx as the dependent variable, measured as an indicator variable equal to one if a 
firm increases capital expenditures, and zero otherwise. Capital expenditures are measured as 
capital expenditures from the statement of cash flows scaled by prior year total assets, and 
change in capital expenditures (ΔCapEx) is measured from year t-1 to year t. B100 is an indicator 
variable equal to one for years when 100% bonus depreciation is available ( 2010 and 2011), and 
zero otherwise. B50 is used as an indicator variable equal to one for years where 50% bonus 
depreciation is available (2008-2010 and 2012), and zero otherwise. Hypothesis 1 states that 
100% bonus depreciation availability will increase the likelihood that a firm will increase capital 
expenditures, therefore I expect a positive coefficient on B100. I do not make a prediction for 
B50 due to ambiguity in prior literature. 
The first control variable is MRep which is used as the dependent variable in the first stage. I 
expect a negative coefficient on MRep. I include several control variables that prior literature 
suggests are determinants of capital expenditures (Fazzari et al. 1988, 2000; Kaplan and Zingales 
1997, 2000; Rauh 2006; Bushman et al. 2011; Campbell et al. 2013). CF is included in the model 
to control for cash flow from operations and is calculated as earnings before depreciation less 
working capital accruals, scaled by prior year total assets (Bushman et al. 2011). Prior literature 
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provides evidence that firms with higher cash flow from operations have a higher level of capital 
expenditures (Fazzari et al. 1988, 2000; Kaplan and Zingales 1997, 2000; Ruah 2006; Campbell 
et al. 2013) and the predicted sign on the coefficient of CF is positive. ΔCash is included in the 
model to address the possibility of firms substituting qualified assets for planned unqualified 
assets and is defined as the change in cash and short term investments reported on the balance 
sheet from year t-1 to year t scaled by total assets. I do not make a sign prediction for ΔCash. 
ΔDebt is the change in total debt reported on the balance sheet from year t-1 to year t scaled by 
total assets and is included to address asset substitution as well. I predict a positive sign.  
TOBINSQ is calculated as the market value of assets scaled by prior year total assets and is 
included in the model to control for growth opportunities. Prior literature suggests that firms with 
more growth opportunities have higher capital expenditures (Fazzari et al. 1988, 2000; Ruah 
2006; Campbell et al. 2013). Hence, in the logistic regressions the predicted sign for TOBINSQ is 
positive. DivYld is measured as dividends per share scaled by stock price (Blouin and Krull 
2009). Prior literature has found a negative relationship between dividends and capital 
investment (Auerbach and Hassett 2002; Skinner 2008). Thus, the predicted sign for the variable 
DivYld is negative. Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the 
prior year. I predict a positive coefficient on Size consistent with prior literature (McConnell and 
Muscarella 1985; Malmendier and Tate 2005; Hulse and Livingstone 2010; Campbell et al. 
2013).  
IMR is the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated in the first stage of the model. GDP is the 
percentage change in annual Gross Domestic Product obtained from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) and is included to control for overall economic factors. Unreported robustness 
tests using other macroeconomic indicators including Gross Domestic Private Investment, the 
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Federal Reserve Rate, and Private Fixed Asset Investment figures from the BEA produce 
qualitatively similar results. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Detailed definitions of the dependent and independent variables from the second stage are 
provided in Appendix B. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Univariate Tests 
Descriptive statistics on the variables in the capital expenditure model are reported in Table 
5, with the sample divided between firms that increase capital expenditures and firms that do not 
increase capital expenditures. Table 5 indicates that 8,304 firms increase capital expenditures 
during the sample period with a mean increase of 4.47% of total assets, while 9,199 firms did not 
increase or decreased capital expenditures, with a mean decrease of -7.47% of total assets. For 
firms that increased capital expenditures, 33.10% did so during the availability of 100% bonus 
depreciation and 51.96 made increases during the availability of 50% bonus depreciation. There 
is no significant difference in net stock repurchases between increasing and non-increasing firms. 
Mean cash outflows from operating activities for increasing firms are significantly lower than 
non-increasing firms with a mean of -1.61% of prior year total assets. Increasing firms have 
significantly larger decreases in cash balances of -1.36% of total assets. Total debt increased 
significantly more for increasing firms with a mean increase of 0.78% of total assets. Tobin’s Q 
was significantly higher for increasing firms with a mean of 3.31. Increasing firms had a 
significantly lower dividend yield with a mean of 1.21%. Increasing firms also had a 
significantly higher market value of equity with a mean logarithm of 5.77. The Inverse Mills 
Ratio is not significantly different between increasing and non-increasing firms. GDP growth 
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was significantly higher in years where firms increased capital expenditures with a mean 
increase of 1.43% Descriptive statistics for the full sample are reported in Panel B of Table 5. 
Insert Table 5 here 
Correlation coefficients among the dependent, test, and control variables are reported in 
Table 6. Unreported univariate and multivariate tests of normality indicate that the variables do 
not follow a normal distribution, which limits the explanatory power of Pearson correlation 
coefficients for continuous variables, thus my discussion uses Spearman correlation coefficients 
(below the diagonal) for continuous variables and Pearson correlation coefficients (above the 
diagonal) for dichotomous variables. My primary interest is on the relation between 100% bonus 
depreciation (B100) availability and whether firms increased capital expenditures (CapEx). 
Consistent with my expectations, I find a positive correlation between 100% bonus depreciation 
availability and capital expenditure increases. CapEx is significantly correlated with the majority 
of the explanatory variables in the main model, with a maximum correlation coefficient of 
0.1895 with TobinsQ. There are significant negative correlations between Size and IMR (-
0.4524) and B50 and GDP (-0.3246) resulting from the construction of the variables. Unreported 
tests show that the higher correlation coefficients do not result in multicollinearity issues. I 
control for these variables in my multivariate analysis to test whether firms with full capital asset 
expensing availability are more likely to increase capital expenditures. 
Insert Table 6 here 
Multivariate Tests – Test of H1  
 Table 7 reports the results of the logistic regressions on the likelihood of increases in capital 
expenditures from equation (2). I estimate the regression for the full sample period in Column 
(1), then for four comparative periods based on the different levels of bonus depreciation similar 
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to the preceding analysis of stock repurchases. Consistent with my hypothesis that there is a 
higher likelihood of firms increasing capital expenditures in years with allowable 100% bonus 
depreciation, the coefficient on B100 is positive and significant (α1 = 0.3405; p<0.01) in Column 
(1) which equates to a 40.6% increase in likelihood. B100 remains positive and significant across 
each subsample suggesting that firms are more likely to increase capital expenditures with 
allowable 100% bonus depreciation than in periods when it was not allowable.5 The coefficient 
on B50 is not significant in the full sample but is positive and significant (α2 = 0.1643; p<0.01)  
in Column (4) but negative and significant (α2 = -0.3148; p<0.01)  in Column (5), indicating that 
firms were more likely to increase capital expenditures when 50% bonus depreciation was 
available compared to no bonus depreciation, but less likely to increase capital expenditures 
when compared to 100% bonus depreciation.  
As expected, MRep has a significant negative coefficient indicating that firms with above 
median share repurchases were less likely to increase capital expenditures, although the effect is 
not significant across all subsamples. Consistent with my expectations, the coefficient on CF is 
positive and significant (α4 = 0.2357; p<0.01) in Column (1) and across all subsamples, which 
suggests that as cash flow increases, the likelihood of increasing capital expenditures increases. 
ΔCash is negative and marginally significant (α5 = -0.1224; p=0.0598) in Column (1) which 
suggests that firms increasing capital expenditures are drawing down cash reserves. ΔCash 
remains negative across all subsamples but is not statistically significant with the exception of 
marginal significance in Column (3). ΔDebt is positive and significant (α5 = 0.5947; p<0.01) in 
Column (1) and across all subsamples which indicates that firms increasing debt were likely to 
increase capital expenditures. As expected, the coefficient on TOBINSQ is positive and 
                                                          
5 Columns (3) and (5) of Tables 7 and 8 exclude the year 2010 due to the mid-year change from 50% to 100% bonus 
depreciation. 
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significant (α5 = 0.0754; p<0.01) in Column (1). TOBINSQ remains positive and significant 
across all subsamples. This represents the higher likelihood of firms increasing capital 
expenditures when they have better investment prospects. The coefficient on DivYld is negative, 
as expected, but is not statistically significant in the main sample or in any subsamples. Size is 
not significant in the full sample reported in Column (1) or any of the subsamples with the 
exception of Column (2) where it is negative and marginally significant (α9 = -0.0248; 
p=0.0539). This may reinforce the findings of Zwick and Mahon (2014) that smaller and more 
financially constrained firms are more likely to take advantage of bonus depreciation than larger 
firms.  
Insert Table 7 here 
Multivariate Tests – Test of H2 
In order to test the magnitude of capital expenditure changes, I replace the dichotomous 
dependent variable in equation (2) with a continuous measure of capital expenditure changes 
defined previously (ΔCapEx) and estimate an ordinary least squares regression rather than a 
logistic regression. I include two interaction terms, ΔCash*CapEx and ΔDebt*CapEx, to more 
fully address the question of asset substitution. The interaction with the dichotomous variable 
CapEx results in the partitioning of the ΔCash and ΔDebt variables between firms that increased 
capital expenditures and those that didn’t. I predict a negative sign on ΔCash and a positive sign 
on ΔDebt.  The predicted signs on all of the remaining variables are consistent with the prior 
model. Results are reported in Table 8 using the same columnar subsamples as the previous 
section. The additional variables result in the following equation: 
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ΔCapEx = α0 + α1B100 + α2B50+ α3MRep + α4CF + α5ΔCash + α6ΔDebt + 
α7ΔCash*CapEx + α8ΔDebt*CapEx + α9TOBINSQ + α10DivYld + α11Size + α12IMR + 
α13GDP + Industry Fixed Effects + ε                             (3) 
The availability of 100% bonus depreciation (B100) had a significantly positive effect on the 
magnitude of capital expenditure increases across all samples with an increase of 2.33% in the 
full sample (α1 = 0.0233; p<0.01), which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. The coefficient on B50 
is positive and significant (α2 = 0.0116; p<0.01) for the full sample in Column (1). Consistent 
with the ambiguity of prior research, B50 is also positive and significant in column (4) (α2 = 
0.0272; p<0.01) but negative and significant in column (5) (α2 = -0.0097; p<0.01). This 
represents the differences in the comparative samples in that 50% bonus depreciation encouraged 
firms to increase the magnitude of capital expenditures when compared to no bonus depreciation, 
but did not when compared to 100% bonus depreciation. A firm’s relation to median share 
repurchases (MRep) does not appear to have any significant effects on the magnitude of capital 
expenditures. ΔCash is positive and significant (α5 = 0.0388; p<0.01) for the full sample and 
across all subsamples. Due to the partitioning of the variable through the use of an interaction 
term, this indicates that firms which did not increase capital expenditures increased their total 
cash holdings. ΔDebt is positive and significant (α6 = 0.0320; p<0.01) in Column (1) and across 
all subsamples with the exception of Column (2) where it is not significantly different from zero. 
The interaction term ΔDebt*CapEx is not significant in the full sample or in any subsamples 
which may suggest that increases in capital expenditures were not part of long-term investment 
decisions. TOBINSQ is positive and significant across all samples, as expected. DivYld is 
insignificantly different from zero in all samples. Contrary to my expectations, Size has negative 
and significant coefficients across all samples. This may be indicative of the results from Zwick 
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and Mahon (2014) that bonus depreciation-related capital expenditure increases were more likely 
for smaller, more financially constrained firms. 
Insert Table 8 here 
Analysis of Stock Performance 
In this section, I use the directEDGAR software to identify the date when financial 
statements were released for firms in my sample. I use the financial statement release date rather 
than earnings announcement date so that all possible financial information regarding capital 
expenditures in the footnotes and management discussion and analysis is available for investors. 
I then calculate one year cumulative abnormal returns using the Eventus 9.0 database Fama-
French daily factors. Due to data limitations within Eventus, my sample size is reduced to 7,422, 
but remains representative of the period. I then partition the remaining sample in two stages 
based on change in net share repurchases. The first partition is into two categories based on 
whether firms increase net share repurchases or not. The second partition is into quintiles based 
on the level of change in net share repurchases. I use quintiles rather than quartiles due to a large 
number of zero change observations within the sample (n=1,484), and because it allows me to 
analyze small and large changes separately. Industries represented in the full sample and each 
level of partitions are reported in Table 9. The industry makeup of the reduced sample and 
partitioned sections remains representative of the full sample reported in Table 2. I then estimate 
the following regression using ordinary least squares: 
CAR = α0 + α1B100 + α2B50 + α3NetSTK + α4ΔCapEx + α5ΔCapEx*B100 + 
α6ΔCapEx*B50 + α7OpInc + α8CF + α9TOBINSQ + α10DivYld + α11Size +α11PYCAR + 
α12SPRtn + Industry Fixed Effects + ε                  (4) 
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CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for the one year period following the release of a firm’s 
annual 10K. PYCAR is the prior year cumulative abnormal return. All other variables are defined 
previously. In order to identify the capital expenditure effects on stock returns during the 100% 
and 50% bonus depreciation periods for each quintile, I include the following interaction terms: 
ΔCapEx*B100 and ΔCapEx*B50. I expect negative coefficients on B100 and B50 due to the 
severe economic turmoil represented in the two periods. I do not make a prediction for ΔCapEx 
due to the varying results from prior research. I expect a positive coefficient on ΔCapEx*B100 
consistent with H3. I do not make a prediction on the sign of ΔCapEx*B50. I expect OpInc to be 
positive because operating income increases are a positive market signal. Titman et al. (2004) 
show that high cash flow firms with abnormal capital investments have monotonic decreases in 
stock returns, thus I expect a negative coefficient on CF. I do not make a prediction on Tobin’s 
Q. DivYld should be positive due to the strong tie between dividend payments and share prices. 
Because PYCAR is an indicator of market momentum, I expect a positive coefficient. I expect a 
negative coefficient on SPRtn because as the market moves as a whole, abnormal price changes 
are less common. I do not include MRep or IMR due to high levels of multicollinearity indicated 
by variance inflation factors. 
Insert Table 9 here 
Univariate Tests 
Descriptive statistics for the cumulative abnormal return subsample are reported in Table 10. 
Panel A reports the means for the first partition on the change in share repurchases and includes 
a Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test of differences between groups. There are 3,711 observations in 
each reported group and significantly higher mean cumulative abnormal returns for firms that 
increased net share repurchases. The increasing firms had a mean cumulative abnormal return of 
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12.43% while non-increasing firms had a mean return of -1.66%. Increasing firms had mean net 
stock repurchases of 6.62% which was significantly different than the -4.64% mean net stock 
repurchases for non-increasing firms. Overall, there was a mean decrease in capital expenditures, 
with a significantly larger mean decrease for firms that increased share repurchases of -1.82% of 
total assets. In the 100% bonus depreciation era, there was a decrease in capital expenditures for 
increasing firms of -22.02%, which is significantly different from the -2.03% decrease for non-
increasing firms. In the 50% bonus depreciation era, there was no significant difference in capital 
expenditure changes despite different signs on the mean statistics. Mean operating income and 
mean cash flow from operations are positive for both groups, but there are no significant 
differences between them. Similarly, Tobin’s Q and dividend yield are positive for both groups, 
but not significantly different. Increasing firms are significantly larger with a natural log of 
market value of equity of 6.65 compared to 6.27 for non-increasing firms. Prior year cumulative 
abnormal returns were significantly higher for non-increasing firms with a mean of 8.17% where 
there was a mean decrease of -4.62% for increasing firms. The mean S&P 500 return was 
significantly higher in in firm years with no net share repurchase increases with a mean of 
0.0047. Descriptive statistics for the full sample are reported in Panel B of Table 10. 
Insert Table 10 here 
Multivariate Tests – Test of H3 
Table 11 reports the results from the cumulative abnormal returns regressions for the full 
sample in Column (1) and results for 100% and 50% bonus depreciation effects for the first 
partition in Columns (2) through (5). As expected, the coefficients on B100 and B50 are negative 
and significant across all columns. NetSTK is positive and significant (α3 = 0.1515; p<0.01) for 
the full sample reported in Column (1) and remains positive across all subsamples. NetSTK, 
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however, does not significantly affect cumulative abnormal returns for firms increasing share 
repurchases in Columns (2) and (4). ΔCapEx is not significantly different from zero in the full 
sample nor is it significant in the partitioned regressions. ΔCapEx*B100, which represents 
capital expenditure changes during the 100% bonus depreciation era, is negative and marginally 
significant (α5 = -.0031; p=0.0967) in Column (1) which does not support H3, and is not 
significantly different from zero in the remaining samples. This indicates that firms increasing 
capital expenditures during the availability of 100% bonus depreciation generally had marginal 
decreases in cumulative abnormal returns irrespective of changes in net share repurchases. 
ΔCapEx*B50 is positive and significant (α6 = 0.003; p=0.0283) in Column (1). It is also 
significant and positive (α6 = 0.0037; p=0.0376) in Column (5) but is not significant in Column 
(4). This indicates that firms which increased capital expenditures during the availability of 50% 
bonus depreciation experienced positive cumulative abnormal returns in general but specifically 
when decreasing share repurchases. 
Insert Table 11 here 
OpInc is not significant for the full sample, but is positive and significant for firms increasing 
share repurchases in Column (2) (α7 = 0.2234; p<0.01) and Column (4) (α7 = 0.2405; p<0.01). 
This indicates that firms with a higher operating income that increase share repurchases 
experience positive cumulative abnormal returns. CF is negative and significant (α8 = -0.2743; 
p<0.01) in Column (1) and across all subsamples as expected. Tobin’s Q is negative and 
significant (α9 = -0.0375; p<0.01) for the full sample as reported in Column (1) and across all 
subsamples as expected. I interpret this finding as investors analyzing investment prospects of 
firms and if they have a high growth rate but are increasing shareholder payouts, there are 
concerns about missed opportunities for growth. DivYld is positive and significant (α10 = 1.6974; 
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p<0.01) in Column (1) as expected and in Columns (3) and (5). This represents the general 
positive market reaction to high dividend yields as well as the different market reaction to firms 
using share repurchases for shareholder payouts. Size is not significant for the full sample, but is 
negative and significant for firms that increased share repurchases as reported in Column (2) (α11 
= -0.0256; p<0.01) and Column (4) (α11 = -0.0328; p<0.01). The change in sign reported in 
Column (5) may indicate the different investor responses to shareholder payout strategies of 
large companies. PYCAR is positive and significant (α12 = 0.1031; p<0.01) in Column (1) and 
across all subsamples as expected, which exhibits the strong relationship between current and 
prior stock performance. SPRtn is negative and significant (α13 = -9.7466; p<0.01) in the full 
sample as reported in Column (1) and across all subsamples, as expected. This indicates the 
difficulty of surpassing mean market performance. 
The next step in my analysis is to partition the full sample into quintiles based on the level of 
change in net share repurchases. Table 12 reports the results from each quintile regression on 
cumulative abnormal returns. As in the prior analysis, the coefficients on B100 and B50 are 
negative and significant across all quintiles. NetSTK is not significant in any quintile. ΔCapEx is 
not significantly different from zero with the exception of the fifth quintile where it is negative 
and significant (α13 = -0.3567; p=0.0245). This suggests that during non-bonus years, when firms 
substantially decrease repurchases in favor of capital expenditures, the market responds 
negatively to these strategic shifts. ΔCapEx*B100, which represents capital expenditure changes 
during the 100% bonus depreciation era, is not significant in any quintile. This leads to a 
rejection of H3 in this partition. ΔCapEx*B50, is only significant in the fifth quintile, but is 
positive. I interpret this finding as the market responding positively to substantial cash flow 
usage changes when firms reap tax benefits from capital investment. The provision for 50% 
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bonus depreciation continues to be extended, thus making it the new normal, which leads to 
investor perception of capital expenditures similar to non-bonus years. Additionally, the 
marginally significant differences in capital expenditure coefficients between the first and fifth 
quintiles for the 50% bonus depreciation period and the similarity with results from the sample in 
Table 11, Column (5) appears to show that investors are more concerned about capital 
expenditure changes when there is a shift away from using free cash flow for share repurchases 
than when repurchases are increasing.  
Insert Table 12 here 
OpInc is only significant in the first quintile (α7 = 0.2806; p<0.01) where it is positive as 
expected, and CF is negative and significant across all quintiles as expected. Tobin’s Q is 
negative and significant across all quintiles. I interpret this finding as investors analyzing 
investment prospects of firms and if they have a high growth rate they may not be increasing 
shareholder payouts, thus negatively impacting stock returns. DivYld is not significant in 
Columns (1) or (2), but is positive and significant in Columns (3) through (5), which reinforces 
the idea that investors in dividend paying firms are more concerned with dividend yield than 
share repurchases. Size is negative and significant (α11 = -0.0330; p<0.01) in Column (2) but 
positive and significant (α11 = 0.0238; p=0.0317) in Column (3), and not significant in any other 
quintile. PYCAR is positive and significant across all quintiles as expected. SPRtn is negative and 
significant across all quintiles, as expected. The significant difference in magnitude between the 
first and fifth quintiles may indicate that firms increasing share repurchases may have an easier 
time beating mean market performance. 
In order to more fully evaluate the effects of the variables of interest in different partitions on 
cumulative abnormal stock returns, I partition the full sample in two additional ways. The first 
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partition is based on firm effective tax rates, where I divide the sample into terciles. The second 
partition is based on changes in capital expenditures and I partition into firms with increases and 
those without. The results of these two new partitions are reported in Table 13. 
Consistent with the prior results, B100 and B50 are negative and significant across all 
columns of both partitions. NetSTK is positive and significant for firms with effective tax rates 
above the mean (α3 = 0.2393; p<0.01), reported in Column (1), and near the mean (α3 = 0.2741; 
p<0.01) as reported in Column (2). I interpret this as positive shareholder responses to stock 
repurchases for profitable firms, i.e., firms with taxable earnings, where there is little to no 
response for firms with little or no taxable earnings. NetSTK is also positive and significant (α3 = 
0.2307; p<0.01) in Column (5), which suggests that shareholders react favorably to firms that 
repurchase shares while also increasing capital expenditures. ΔCapEx is positive and significant 
(α3 = 0.6415; p<0.01) only for firms increasing capital expenditures as reported in Column (5). 
ΔCapEx*B100 is not significant in any regression in either partition, which leads me to reject 
H3. ΔCapEx*B50 is positive and significant (α6 = 0.0042; p<0.01) in Column (2), indicating a 
positive investor response to increases in capital expenditures during the availability of 50% 
bonus depreciation for firms with effective tax rates near the mean of the sample. 
Insert Table 13 here 
OpInc is positive and significant (α7 = 0.2400; p=0.0110) in Column (3), but only marginally 
significant in Columns (1) and (2). This suggests that market responses to higher operating 
income are more important for firms with below average effective tax rates, while still being 
relevant to firms with higher effective tax rates. As with prior results, CF is negative and 
significant for all regressions of both partitions with the exception of Column (2) where there is 
no significant effect. TobinsQ is negative and significant across all columns of both partitions. 
32 
 
 
 
DivYld is positive and significant for low tax firms (α10 = 2.2443; p<0.01) in Column (3) and for 
firms increasing capital expenditures (α10 = 2.7888; p<0.01) in Column (5), but only marginally 
significant for firms near the mean effective tax rate in Column (2). This indicates that investors 
value high dividend payouts from firms with low effective tax rates and growing firms that are 
increasing capital expenditures. Consistent with expectations PYCAR is significant and positive 
across all columns of both partitions. SPRtn is negative and significant for all columns of each 
partition, which is similar to prior results. 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines how firms react to temporary capital asset expensing provisions and the 
stock market effects of changes in capital expenditures. Prior literature suggests that firms with 
30% and 50% bonus depreciation availability are not more likely to increase capital 
expenditures. I provide evidence that firms are more likely to increase capital expenditures when 
100% bonus depreciation is available, which suggests that temporary full expensing is a more 
effective capital investment stimulus than temporary partial expensing. The policy implications 
of this difference are clear; stimulus provisions temporarily allowing full expensing of capital 
assets are more likely to fulfill the legislative intent of increasing capital investment than those 
offering only partial expensing. In addition, I show a significant increase in the magnitude of 
capital expenditures when 100% bonus depreciation is available. I also show that there are 
conflicting stock price effects when firms increase capital investment, which indicates that 
managers should carefully consider strategic cash flow usage when evaluating the benefits of 
new tax provisions. 
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Appendix A 
Statement of Cash flows Excerpt 
RENT A CENTER INC 
Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (USD $) 12 Months Ended 
In Thousands, unless otherwise specified Dec. 31, 2012 
Dec. 31, 
2011 
Dec. 31, 
2010 
Cash flows from financing activities     
Purchase of treasury stock -61,860 -164,169 -84,520 
Exercise of stock options 14,121 34,910 19,040 
Tax benefit related to stock option exercises 
-4,348 -7,036 -2,974 
Payments on capital leases -27 -285 -979 
Issuance of senior notes 0 0 300,000 
Proceeds from debt 606,570 982,825 92,230 
Repayments of debt -659,745 -943,264 -402,274 
Dividends paid -37,866 -26,891 -7,804 
Net cash used in financing activities -134,459 -109,838 -81,333 
Effect of exchange rate changes on cash 310 -201 950 
NET INCREASE (DECREASE) IN CASH AND CASH 
EQUIVALENTS -26,978 17,338 -31,076 
Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year 
88,065 70,727 101,803 
Cash and cash equivalents at end of year 61,087 88,065 70,727 
Cash paid during the year for:     
Interest 31,574 35,609 20,569 
Income taxes (excludes $4,169, $113,202 and $330 of income taxes 
refunded in 2012, 2011 and 2010, respectively) $88,873  $10,522  $124,065  
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Appendix B 
First Stage Variables (Share Repurchases) 
Variable names Variable definitions 
NetSTK Stock repurchases less stock issuances scaled by total stockholders’ equity 
Repurchase Indicator variable equal to one if a firm increased net share repurchases and zero otherwise. 
MRep Indicator variable equal to one if a firm has above median share repurchases and zero otherwise. 
B100 Indicator variable equal to one for years where 100% bonus depreciation is available (2010 to 2011), and zero otherwise. 
B50 Indicator variable equal to one for years where 50% bonus depreciation is available (2008-2010 and 2012), and zero otherwise. 
ΔCapEx Change in capital expenditures from the statement of cash flows scaled by prior year total assets measured from year t-1 to year t. 
Size (First Stage Probit) The natural logarithm of total assets. 
OpInc The average ratio of operating income to total assets for the prior three years. 
NopInc The average ratio of non-operating income to total assets for the prior three years. 
StdOIRAT The standard deviation of the ratio of operating income to total assets measured over the five years from year t-4 to year t. 
LagDIV The prior year’s ratio of total dividends to net income available to common shareholders. 
Avg The mean market return of a firm’s stock calculated using the CRSP monthly returns for the current year. 
PYavg The mean market return of a firm’s stock calculated using the CRSP monthly returns for the prior year. 
TOBINSQ Tobin’s Q, calculated as the market value of assets scaled by total assets from the prior year 
SPRtn The annual return on the S&P500 for each fiscal year. 
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Appendix B 
Second Stage Variables (Capital Investment Model) 
Variable names Variable definitions 
CapEx Indicator variable equal to one if a firm increased capital expenditures and zero otherwise. 
CF 
Cash flow from operations calculated as earnings before depreciation 
less working capital accruals, scaled by total assets from the prior 
year 
ΔCash The change in cash and short term investments reported on the balance sheet from year t-1 to year t scaled by total assets. 
ΔDebt The change in total debt reported on the balance sheet from year t-1 to year t scaled by total assets. 
DivYld Dividends per share scaled by price. 
Size (Logit and OLS Regressions) The natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the prior year.  
IMR Inverse Mills Ratio 
GDP The percentage change in annual Gross Domestic Product obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Analysis 
CAR The cumulative abnormal return for the one year period following the release of a firm’s annual 10K. 
PYCAR The cumulative abnormal return for the one year period following the release of a firm’s annual 10K for year t-1 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Bonus Depreciation Allowance Legislation 
Legislation 
Bonus 
Depreciation 
Percentage 
AMT / Research 
Credit Alternative* 
Effective 
Dates 
Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 30% None 9/12/2001 - 12/31/2004 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 50% None 5/6/2003 - 12/31/2005 
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 50% $30M / 6% 1/1/2008 - 12/31/2008 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 50% $30M / 6% 1/1/2009 - 12/31/2009 
Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 50% $30M / 6% 1/1/2010 - 12/31/2010 
Tax Relief, Unemployment Compensation Reauthorization, 
and Job Creation Act of 2010 100% (50%) 
$30M / 6%               
AMT Only 
9/9/2010 - 
12/31/2011 
(12/31/2013)** 
*Firms could elect to forgo bonus depreciation in order to accelerate AMT or Research Credits which carried over 
from prior years. 
**50% bonus depreciation was extended two additional years beyond the expiration of 100% bonus depreciation. 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Selection and Industry Distribution 
Panel A: Sample Selection     
Compustat Calendar Year Firm Observations from 2006 to 2012  43,746  
Less:     
Financial Service Firms (6000 ≤ SIC ≥ 6999)    (11,181) 
Utility Firms (4900 ≤ SIC ≥ 4949)    (1,960) 
Firms with Total Assets < $1 Million    (736) 
Observations with missing data    (13,102) 
Final Sample (4,084 Unique Firms)    17,503  
     
Panel B: Industry Distribution     
Industry Type*  Observations  Percentage 
Consumer NonDurables -- Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys 923  5.27% 
Consumer Durables -- Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances 459  2.62% 
Manufacturing -- Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Off Furn, Paper, Com 
Printing 2,077  11.87% 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products  1,465  8.37% 
Chemicals and Allied Products  560  3.20% 
Business Equipment -- Computers, Software, and Electronic Equipment 3,819  21.82% 
Telephone and Television Transmission  883  5.04% 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops) 1,351  7.72% 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs  2,650  15.14% 
Other -- Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertainment 3,316  18.95% 
Total  17,503  100.00% 
*Industries follow the Fama-French 12 Industry Classifications   
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics Tests of Differences in Means by Increase in Stock Repurchase Choice 
Panel A       
 Increasing Firms  Non-Increasing Firms 
Variables N Mean   N Mean   
Change in Stock Repurchases (%) 8,604  0.0366  8,899  -0.0365 *** 
B100 8,604  0.2696  8,899  0.2774  
B50 8,604  0.5413  8,899  0.5944 *** 
Change in Capital Expenditures 
(ΔCapEx) 8,604  -0.0261  8,899  -0.0102 *** 
Size (in Millions) (Size) 8,604  3,093.59  8,899  3,179.92 *** 
Tobin's Q 8,604  2.7375  8,899  2.8009  
Operating Income (%) (OpInc) 8,604  -0.0051  8,899  0.0017  
Non-Operating Income (%) (NopInc) 8,604  0.0080  8,899  0.0081  
Standard Deviation of Operating 
Income (%) (StdOIRat) 8,604  0.1863  8,899  0.1932  
Lagged Dividend Payout Ratio (%) 
(LagDIV) 8,604  0.1341  8,899  0.1405 ** 
Stock Returns (Avg) 8,604  0.0305  8,899  1.8029 *** 
Prior Year Stock Returns (PYavg) 8,604  0.6645  8,899  1.5860 *** 
S&P 500 Average Return (SPRtn) 8,604  0.0002  8,899  0.0045 *** 
*, **, and *** denote a difference in means with significance of p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 respectively. 
       
Panel B             
Variables N Mean Std Dev Lower 
Quartile 
Median Upper 
Quartile 
Change in Stock Repurchases (%) 17,503  -0.0006 0.1167 0 0 0 
B100 17,503  0.2736 0.4458 0 0 1 
B50 17,503  0.5683 0.4953 0 1 1 
Change in Capital Expenditures 
(ΔCapEx) 17,503  -0.0180 0.1684 -0.0156 -0.0004 0.0110 
Size (in Millions) (Size) 17,503  3,137.48 9,162.38 57.44 304.95 
1,542.2
0 
Tobin's Q 17,503  2.7697 4.2406 1.0754 1.5953 2.6625 
Operating Income (%) (OpInc) 17,503  -0.0017 0.3309 -0.0139 0.0934 0.1530 
Non-Operating Income (%) (NopInc) 17,503  0.0081 0.0315 0.0007 0.0047 0.0127 
Standard Deviation of Operating 
Income (%) (StdOIRat) 17,503  0.1898 0.5721 0.0243 0.0489 0.1097 
Lagged Dividend Payout Ratio (%) 
(LagDIV) 17,503  0.1374 0.5042 0 0 0.0528 
Stock Returns (Avg) 17,503  0.9316 6.1366 -2.1774 0.8752 3.5884 
Prior Year Stock Returns (PYavg) 17,503  1.1330 6.5038 -2.0414 0.9179 3.6111 
S&P 500 Average Return (SPRtn) 17,503  0.0024 0.0179 0.0010 0.0108 0.0115 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Likelihood of Above Median Share Repurchases - Heckman First Stage Probit Regressions 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Full Sample (2006 - 
2012) 
 0/100% Bonus Eras 
(2006-2007, 2010-2011) 
 50%/100% Bonus Eras 
(2008-2012) 
 0/50% Bonus Eras 
(2006-2010, 2012) 
 50%/100% Bonus Eras 
(2008-2012): 50% Effect  
     
    Estimate Pr > ChiSq   Estimate Pr > ChiSq   Estimate Pr > ChiSq   Estimate Pr > ChiSq   Estimate Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept  0.3170 <.0001  0.4004 <.0001  0.5402 <.0001  0.1272 0.0023  0.7051 <.0001 
B100  0.0853 <.0001  0.2242 <.0001  -0.0520 0.0351       
B50  0.0705 0.0004        0.2034 <.0001  -0.2202 <.0001 
ΔCapEx  -0.0164 0.7810  -0.0325 0.6768  0.0751 0.3256  -0.0346 0.5746  0.0375 0.6239 
Size  -0.0491 <.0001  -0.0577 <.0001  -0.0549 <.0001  -0.0381 <.0001  -0.0561 <.0001 
OpInc  -0.2458 <.0001  -0.2157 <.0001  -0.2888 <.0001  -0.2204 <.0001  -0.2853 <.0001 
NopInc  -0.9398 0.0024  -0.4379 0.2899  -1.0662 0.0037  -0.7866 0.0187  -0.9453 0.0103 
stdOIRAT  -0.1726 <.0001  -0.1967 <.0001  -0.1855 <.0001  -0.1501 <.0001  -0.1863 <.0001 
lagDIV  -0.0206 0.2889  -0.0542 0.0431  0.0076 0.7332  -0.0287 0.1711  0.0052 0.8165 
Avg  0.0040 0.0316  0.0124 <.0001  -0.0044 0.0409  0.0056 0.0040  -0.0016 0.4716 
PYAvg  -0.0036 0.0276  -0.0022 0.3490  -0.0070 0.0003  -0.0038 0.0324  -0.0050 0.0107 
TOBINSQ  0.0132 <.0001  0.0203 <.0001  0.0062 0.0766  0.0172 <.0001  0.0051 0.1455 
SPRtn  -5.3669 <.0001  -29.6303 <.0001  -2.1386 0.0038  -4.6181 <.0001  -3.1942 <.0001 
                
Firms Below 
Median 
          
9,346    
          
5,047    
          
6,928    
          
7,874    
          
6,928   
Firms Above 
Median 
          
8,157    
          
4,975    
          
5,342    
          
7,306    
          
5,342   
Total 
Observations 
        
17,503    
        
10,022    
        
12,270    
        
15,180    
        
12,270   
                
Log Likelihood -11744.50   -6622.58   -8188.75   -10181.80   -8164.50  
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TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Differences in Means by Increase in Capital Expenditures Choice 
Panel A Increasing Firms  Non-Increasing Firms 
Variables N Mean   N Mean   
Change in Capital Expenditures / 
Lagged Total Assets (ΔCapEx) 8,304 0.0447  9,199 -0.0747 *** 
B100 8,304 0.3310  9,199 0.2218 *** 
B50 8,304 0.5196  9,199 0.6122 *** 
Net Stock Repurchases / Stockholders' 
Equity (NetSTK) 8,304 0.0206  9,199 -0.0433  
Median Repurchase (Mrep) 8,304 0.4595  9,199 0.4719  
Cash Flow / Lagged Total Assets (CF) 8,304 -0.0161  9,199 -0.0294 *** 
Change in Cash / Total Assets (ΔCash) 8,304 -0.0136  9,199 -0.0129 *** 
Change in Total Debt / Total Assets 
(ΔDebt) 8,304 0.0078  9,199 0.0009 *** 
ΔCash*CapEx 8,304 -0.0121  9,199 0.0000  
ΔDebt*CapEx 8,304 0.0078  9,199 0.0000 *** 
Tobin's Q (TOBINSQ) 8,304 3.3085  9,199 2.2834 *** 
Dividend Yield (%) (DivYld) 8,304 0.0121  9,199 0.0124 *** 
Natural Logarithm of Market Value of 
Equity (Size) 8,304 5.7681  9,199 5.6686 *** 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) 8,304 0.8617  9,199 0.8609  
Change in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) 8,304 1.4348  9,199 0.7468 *** 
*, **, and *** denote a difference in means with significance of p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 respectively. 
       
Panel B       
Variables N Mean Std Dev 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
Change in Capital Expenditures / 
Lagged Total Assets (ΔCapEx) 17,503 -0.0180 0.1684 -0.0156 -0.0004 0.0110 
B100 17,503 0.2736 0.4458 0 0 1 
B50 17,503 0.5683 0.4953 0 1 1 
Net Stock Repurchases / Stockholders' 
Equity (NetSTK) 17,503 -0.0130 3.0481 -0.0155 0 0 
Median Repurchase (Mrep) 17,503 0.4660 0.4989 0 0 1 
Cash Flow / Lagged Total Assets (CF) 17,503 -0.0231 0.5054 -0.0631 0.0639 0.1525 
Change in Cash / Total Assets (ΔCash) 17,503 -0.0132 0.2464 -0.0618 0.0016 0.0588 
Change in Total Debt / Total Assets 
(ΔDebt) 17,503 0.0042 0.1325 -0.0209 0 0.0185 
ΔCash*CapEx 17,503 -0.0058 0.1438 0 0 0 
ΔDebt*CapEx 17,503 0.0037 0.1947 0 0 0 
Tobin's Q (TOBINSQ) 17,503 2.7697 4.2406 1.0754 1.5953 2.6625 
Dividend Yield (%) (DivYld) 17,503 0.0123 0.0310 0 0 0.0098 
Natural Logarithm of Market Value of 
Equity (Size) 17,503 5.7158 2.3338 4.0768 5.7671 7.2898 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) 17,503 0.8613 0.1700 0.7410 0.8421 0.9622 
Change in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) 17,503 1.0732 1.8514 -0.3000 1.8000 2.5000 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Pearson / Spearman Correlation Coefficients, N = 17503 
 ΔCapEx B100 B50 MRep CF ΔCash ΔDebt TOBINSQ DivYld Size IMR GDP 
ΔCapEx  0.1251 -0.0940 -0.0149 0.0737 -0.0284 0.0401 0.1895 0.0155 -0.0164 0.0273 0.1491 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.049 <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 0.0403 0.0297 0.0003 <.0001 
B100 0.0605  -0.0661 -0.0185 0.0254 -0.0342 -0.0245 0.0141 -0.0068 0.0210 0.0976 0.1671 
 <.0001  <.0001 0.0146 0.0008 <.0001 0.0012 0.063 0.3665 0.0054 <.0001 <.0001 
B50 -0.0281 -0.0661  -0.0335 -0.0277 0.0062 -0.0032 -0.1606 0.0174 -0.0335 0.1692 -0.3246 
 0.0002 <.0001  <.0001 0.0003 0.4132 0.6756 <.0001 0.0213 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
MRep -0.0021 -0.0185 -0.0335  0.1067 -0.0369 0.0524 -0.0745 0.1323 0.1032 -0.2028 0.0464 
 0.7831 0.0146 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
CF -0.0259 0.0119 -0.0026 0.0649  0.0945 -0.2255 0.1783 0.2493 0.3410 -0.2616 0.0413 
 0.0006 0.1146 0.7351 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ΔCash 0.0297 -0.0054 0.0035 -0.0223 0.0096  -0.0408 0.0761 -0.0124 -0.0369 -0.0142 -0.0167 
  <.0001 0.4786 0.6418 0.0032 0.2032  <.0001 <.0001 0.1010 <.0001 0.0603 0.0269 
ΔDebt 0.0198 -0.0248 -0.0045 0.0501 -0.1677 -0.0393  0.0146 0.0315 0.0103 0.0444 -0.0111 
  0.0087 0.0010 0.5486 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.0530 <.0001 0.1721 <.0001 0.1427 
TOBINSQ 0.1728 0.0009 -0.0788 -0.0693 -0.2984 0.1046 0.0060  -0.0190 0.1318 0.1240 0.1862 
 <.0001 0.9019 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.4282  0.0121 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
DivYld -0.0165 -0.0356 0.0632 0.0446 0.1128 -0.0187 0.0499 -0.0806  0.4139 -0.3565 -0.0041 
 0.0294 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0132 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.5858 
Size -0.0625 0.0209 -0.0329 0.1006 0.2652 -0.0235 0.0223 -0.1024 0.1849  -0.4686 0.0285 
 <.0001 0.0058 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0019 0.0031 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.0002 
IMR 0.0125 0.0866 0.1681 -0.1948 -0.3297 -0.0168 0.0095 0.3765 -0.1576 -0.4524  -0.1312 
 0.0980 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0267 0.2091 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 
GDP 0.0668 0.3283 -0.4598 0.0014 0.0029 -0.0190 0.0134 0.0688 -0.0277 0.0669 -0.0524  
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8553 0.6977 0.0121 0.0758 <.0001 0.0003 <.0001 <.0001  
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TABLE 7 
Likelihood of Capital Expenditure Increases - Logistic Regressions 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Full Sample (2006 - 
2012) 
 0/100% Bonus Eras 
(2006-2007, 2010-
2011) 
 50%/100% Bonus Eras 
(2008-2012): 100% 
Effect 
 0/50% Bonus Eras 
(2006-2010, 2012) 
 50%/100% Bonus Eras 
(2008-2012): 50% 
Effect 
 
     
  Predicted Sign Estimate Pr > ChiSq   Estimate Pr > ChiSq   Estimate Pr > ChiSq   Estimate Pr > ChiSq   Estimate Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept  -0.5648 0.0008  0.7725 0.0145  -0.8033 <.0001  -0.6329 0.0003  -0.4107 0.0448 
B100 + 0.3405 <.0001  0.4527 <.0001  0.3185 <.0001       
B50 ? -0.0363 0.3214        0.1643 0.0001  -0.3148 <.0001 
MRep - -0.0574 0.0726  -0.0962 0.0222  -0.0640 0.0974  -0.0344 0.3164  -0.0287 0.4566 
CF + 0.2357 <.0001  0.1831 0.0001  0.2594 <.0001  0.2438 <.0001  0.2645 <.0001 
ΔCash ? -0.1224 0.0598  -0.0072 0.9328  -0.1292 0.0988  -0.1040 0.137  -0.1135 0.1471 
ΔDebt + 0.5947 <.0001  0.4104 0.009  0.5410 0.0005  0.5825 <.0001  0.4965 0.0014 
TOBINSQ + 0.0754 <.0001  0.0867 <.0001  0.0721 <.0001  0.0795 <.0001  0.0740 <.0001 
DivYld - -0.1087 0.8351  -1.3095 0.119  -0.2076 0.7234  -0.0788 0.8862  -0.4134 0.4798 
Size + 0.0005 0.9532  -0.0248 0.0539  0.0001 0.9944  -0.0086 0.3436  -0.0042 0.6801 
IMR ? -0.0456 0.7849  -1.4464 <.0001  0.2092 0.272  -0.0754 0.6677  0.1841 0.3335 
GDP ? 0.1696 <.0001  0.1092 0.0169  0.1775 <.0001  0.2127 <.0001  0.2109 <.0001 
                
Increasing Firms 
          
8,304    
          
5,402    
          
5,651    
          
6,968    
          
5,651   
Non-Increasing Firms 
          
9,199    
          
4,620    
          
6,619    
          
8,212    
          
6,619   
Total Observations 
        
17,503    
        
10,022    
        
12,270    
        
15,180    
        
12,270   
                
Likelihood Ratio 1048.45 <.0001  325.70 <.0001  851.16 <.0001  903.71 <.0001  848.29 <.0001 
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TABLE 8 
Magnitude of Change in Capital Expenditures Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Full Sample (2006 
- 2012) 
 0/100% Bonus 
Eras (2006-2007, 
2010-2011) 
 50%/100% Bonus 
Eras (2008-2012) 
 0/50% Bonus Eras 
(2006-2010, 2012) 
 50%/100% Bonus 
Eras (2008-2012): 
50% Effect 
 
     
  Predicted Sign Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t| 
Intercept  0.0943 <.0001  0.2593 <.0001  0.0902 <.0001  0.0836 <.0001  0.1040 <.0001 
B100 + 0.0233 <.0001  0.0454 <.0001  0.0118 0.0009       
B50 ? 0.0116 <.0001        0.0272 <.0001  -0.0097 0.0076 
MRep - 0.0001 0.9697  0.0005 0.8910  -0.0007 0.7990  0.0020 0.4810  0.0004 0.8798 
CF + 0.0124 <.0001  0.0122 0.0005  0.0150 <.0001  0.0116 0.0001  0.0151 <.0001 
ΔCash ? 0.0388 <.0001  0.0307 0.0012  0.0434 <.0001  0.0398 <.0001  0.0436 <.0001 
ΔDebt + 0.0320 0.0036  0.0157 0.2695  0.0450 0.0004  0.0288 0.0167  0.0435 0.0006 
ΔCash*CapEx - -0.0887 <.0001  -0.0613 <.0001  -0.0977 <.0001  -0.0898 <.0001  -0.0970 <.0001 
ΔDebt*CapEx + 0.0070 0.3413  0.0062 0.5172  0.0011 0.8914  0.0080 0.3425  0.0009 0.9110 
TOBINSQ + 0.0086 <.0001  0.0106 <.0001  0.0078 <.0001  0.0090 <.0001  0.0079 <.0001 
DivYld - 0.0230 0.5809  -0.0970 0.1506  0.0325 0.4536  0.0192 0.6696  0.0240 0.5779 
Size + -0.0080 <.0001  -0.0135 <.0001  -0.0070 <.0001  -0.0080 <.0001  -0.0071 <.0001 
IMR ? -0.1343 <.0001  -0.2979 <.0001  -0.1149 <.0001  -0.1375 <.0001  -0.1167 <.0001 
GDP ? 0.0043 <.0001  -0.0005 0.8928  0.0059 <.0001  0.0073 <.0001  0.0072 <.0001 
                
Increasing 
Firms  
          
8,304    
          
5,402    
          
5,651    
          
6,968    
          
5,651   
Non-Increasing Firms 
          
9,199    
          
4,620    
          
6,619    
          
8,212    
          
6,619   
Total Observations 
        
17,503    
        
10,022    
        
12,270    
        
15,180    
        
12,270   
                
Adjusted R-Square 0.0524   0.0608   0.0502   0.0533   0.0499  
F Value  44.97   31.89   31.87   41.66   31.68  
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TABLE 9 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Sample Industry Distribution: Change in Repurchases 
 
Full Sample 
 
Increasing Firms 
 
Non-Increasing 
Firms 
      
 Obs %  Obs %  Obs %       
Consumer NonDurables 413 5.56%  194 5.23%  219 5.90%       
Consumer Durables 220 2.96%  106 2.86%  114 3.07%       
Manufacturing 1,168 15.74%  590 15.90%  578 15.58%       
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 604 8.14%  286 7.71%  318 8.57%       
Chemicals and Allied Products 323 4.35%  156 4.20%  167 4.50%       
Business Equipment 1,339 18.04%  703 18.94%  636 17.14%       
Telephone and Television Transmission 377 5.08%  168 4.53%  209 5.63%       
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 644 8.68%  347 9.35%  297 8.00%       
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 896 12.07%  446 12.02%  450 12.13%       
Other 1,438 19.37%  715 19.27%  723 19.48%       
Total 7,422 100.00%  3,711 100.00%  3,711 100.00%       
               
Cumulative Abnormal Return Sample Industry Quintile Distribution (Reverse Sort) 
 Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
 Obs %  Obs %  Obs %  Obs %  Obs % 
Consumer NonDurables 71 4.78%  71 4.78%  95 6.40%  93 6.26%  83 5.59% 
Consumer Durables 42 2.83%  45 3.03%  52 3.50%  39 2.63%  42 2.83% 
Manufacturing 198 13.34%  246 16.57%  276 18.60%  247 16.63%  201 13.54% 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 132 8.89%  93 6.26%  154 10.38%  99 6.67%  126 8.49% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 58 3.91%  66 4.44%  65 4.38%  69 4.65%  65 4.38% 
Business Equipment 282 19.00%  295 19.87%  208 14.02%  288 19.39%  266 17.92% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 77 5.19%  58 3.91%  86 5.80%  76 5.12%  80 5.39% 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 132 8.89%  157 10.57%  118 7.95%  114 7.68%  123 8.29% 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 208 14.02%  163 10.98%  138 9.30%  181 12.19%  206 13.88% 
Other 284 19.14%  291 19.60%  292 19.68%  279 18.79%  292 19.68% 
Total 1,484 100.00%  1,485 100.00%  1,484 100.00%  1,485 100.00%  1,484 100.00% 
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TABLE 10 
Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Differences in Means by Stock Repurchase Change 
Panel A Increasing Firms  Non-Increasing Firms 
Variables N Mean   N Mean   
One Year Cumulative Abnormal Return (%) 3,711 0.1243  3,711 -0.0166 *** 
B100 3,711 0.2905  3,711 0.2802  
B50 3,711 0.5287  3,711 0.6095 *** 
Net Stock Repurchases (%) 3,711 0.0662  3,711 -0.0464 *** 
Change in Net Stock Repurchases (%) 3,711 0.1971  3,711 -0.1401 *** 
Change in Capital Expenditures / Lagged Total 
Assets (ΔCapEx) 3,711 -0.0182  3,711 -0.0082 *** 
ΔCapEx * B100 3,711 -0.2202  3,711 -0.0203 ** 
ΔCapEx * B50 3,711 -0.1301  3,711 0.1189  
Operating Income (%) (OpInc) 3,711 0.0898  3,711 0.0924  
Cash Flow / Lagged Total Assets (CF) 3,711 0.0614  3,711 0.0672  
Tobin's Q (TOBINSQ) 3,711 2.2164  3,711 2.2224  
Dividend Yield (%) (DivYld) 3,711 0.0108  3,711 0.0124  
Natural Logarithm of Market Value of Equity 
(Size) 3,711 6.6486  3,711 6.2691 *** 
Prior Year Cumulative Abnormal Return (%) 
(PYCAR) 3,711 -0.0462  3,711 0.0817 *** 
S&P 500 Average Return (SPRtn) 3,711 0.0004  3,711 0.0047 *** 
*, **, and *** denote a difference in means with significance of p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 respectively. 
       
Panel B       
Variables N Mean Std Dev 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
One Year Cumulative Abnormal Return (%) 7,422 0.0538 0.8139 -0.36875 0.0151 0.4250 
B100 7,422 0.2854 0.4516 0 0 1 
B50 7,422 0.5691 0.4952 0 1 1 
Net Stock Repurchases (%) 7,422 0.0099 0.2236 -0.01003 0 0.0306 
Change in Net Stock Repurchases (%) 7,422 0.0285 0.4370 -0.01786 0 0.0425 
Change in Capital Expenditures / Lagged Total 
Assets (ΔCapEx) 7,422 -0.0132 0.1409 -0.01322 -0.0002 0.0108 
ΔCapEx * B100 7,422 -0.1203 6.0345 0 0 0 
ΔCapEx * B50 7,422 -0.0056 7.6715 -0.00348 0 0.0002 
Operating Income (%) (OpInc) 7,422 0.0911 0.1961 0.07056 0.1189 0.1678 
Cash Flow / Lagged Total Assets (CF) 7,422 0.0643 0.2855 0.00695 0.0813 0.1534 
Tobin's Q (TOBINSQ) 7,422 2.2194 2.8958 1.12082 1.5483 2.3152 
Dividend Yield (%) (DivYld) 7,422 0.0116 0.0262 0 0 0.0135 
Natural Logarithm of Market Value of Equity 
(Size) 7,422 6.4588 2.0099 5.07929 6.4685 7.8162 
Prior Year Cumulative Abnormal Return (%) 
(PYCAR) 7,422 0.0177 0.8529 -0.41179 -0.0110 0.4066 
S&P 500 Average Return (SPRtn) 7,422 0.0026 0.0176 0.00096 0.0108 0.0115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 11 
One Year Cumulative Abnormal Returns Following 10-K Release: Change in Share Repurchases  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
  Full Sample  
Increase in Share 
Repurchases (100% 
Bonus Effect) 
 No Increase in Share 
Repurchases (100% 
Bonus Effect) 
 Increase in Share 
Repurchases (50% 
Bonus Effect) 
 No Increase in Share 
Repurchases (50% 
Bonus Effect) 
 
       
  Predicted Sign Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   
Intercept  0.3079 <.0001  0.4052 <.0001  0.0498 0.3377  0.4997 <.0001  0.0620 0.2486  
B100 - -0.1626 <.0001  -0.1772 <.0001  -0.1308 <.0001        
B50 - -0.1638 <.0001        -0.1954 <.0001  -0.0954 0.0003  
NetSTK + 0.1515 0.0003  0.0672 0.2481  0.1729 0.0084  0.0460 0.4284  0.1769 0.0072  
ΔCapEx ? -0.0218 0.7456  0.0404 0.6508  -0.0826 0.4326  -0.0040 0.9643  -0.1379 0.1791  
ΔCapEx * B100 + -0.0031 0.0967  -0.0015 0.3198  -0.0030 0.8259        
ΔCapEx * B50 ? 0.0033 0.0283        -0.0009 0.587  0.0037 0.0376  
OpInc + 0.0868 0.1212  0.2234 0.0043  -0.0312 0.6991  0.2405 0.0021  -0.0005 0.9947  
CF - -0.2743 <.0001  -0.2728 <.0001  -0.2546 <.0001  -0.2744 <.0001  -0.2773 <.0001  
TOBINSQ ? -0.0375 <.0001  -0.0402 <.0001  -0.0286 <.0001  -0.0403 <.0001  -0.0305 <.0001  
DivYld + 1.6974 <.0001  0.5052 0.3355  2.3734 <.0001  0.8420 0.1072  2.5687 <.0001  
Size + -0.0064 0.1883  -0.0256 0.0003  0.0098 0.1446  -0.0328 <.0001  0.0118 0.0803  
PYCAR + 0.1031 <.0001  0.1260 <.0001  0.0713 <.0001  0.1501 <.0001  0.0930 <.0001  
SPRtn - -9.7466 <.0001  -6.8864 <.0001  -11.3708 <.0001  -8.7807 <.0001  -11.4822 <.0001  
                 
Total Observations  
          
7,422    
          
3,711    
          
3,711    
          
3,711    
          
3,711    
                 
Adjusted R-
Square  0.1168   0.1086   0.1108   0.1127   0.1099   
F Value  45.63   23.60   24.11   24.57   23.91   
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TABLE 12 
One Year Cumulative Abnormal Returns Following 10-K Release: Change in Share Repurchase Quintiles  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
  Large Increase in 
Share Repurchases 
 Small to Moderate Increase in Share 
Repurchases 
 Zero Increase in 
Share Repurchases 
 Small to Moderate 
Decrease in Share 
Repurchases 
 Large Decrease in 
Share Repurchases 
 
       
  Predicted Sign Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|   
Intercept  0.3657 0.0001  0.7245 <.0001  0.3347 0.0006  0.1228 0.1266  0.0046 0.9609  
B100 - -0.1618 0.0005  -0.2086 <.0001  -0.1765 0.0004  -0.1352 0.0008  -0.1332 0.0106 *** 
B50 - -0.1576 0.0002  -0.2427 <.0001  -0.1947 <.0001  -0.1128 0.0026  -0.1310 0.0019 *** 
NetSTK + 0.0590 0.3634  -0.0171 0.9445  0.0792 0.9416  0.1650 0.5676  0.1200 0.1005 *** 
ΔCapEx ? 0.0164 0.8804  0.0948 0.6088  0.0259 0.9118  0.0803 0.6692  -0.3567 0.0245  
ΔCapEx * B100 + -0.0006 0.8610  0.0018 0.9710  0.0006 0.9740  0.0979 0.6188  0.0142 0.9721  
ΔCapEx * B50 ? 0.0087 0.1652  -0.0029 0.9546  -0.0071 0.7392  0.0025 0.1574  0.0166 0.0111 * 
OpInc + 0.2806 0.0047  -0.0853 0.5807  -0.0256 0.9075  0.0801 0.5249  0.0166 0.8843 *** 
CF - -0.2392 <.0001  -0.4552 <.0001  -0.3121 0.0053  -0.2572 0.0083  -0.3216 <.0001  
TOBINSQ ? -0.0263 <.0001  -0.0858 <.0001  -0.0480 <.0001  -0.0249 0.0022  -0.0393 <.0001  
DivYld + -0.1852 0.8244  1.0163 0.2086  1.7319 0.0375  3.2597 <.0001  2.5354 0.0014 *** 
Size + -0.0132 0.2665  -0.0330 0.0021  0.0097 0.4530  0.0000 0.9976  0.0238 0.0317  
PYCAR + 0.1521 <.0001  0.0882 0.0004  0.1184 <.0001  0.0625 0.0096  0.0879 0.0002 *** 
SPRtn - -9.9448 <.0001  -7.7365 <.0001  -9.7241 <.0001  -9.4558 <.0001  -10.3339 <.0001 *** 
                 
Total 
Observations  
          
1,484    
          
1,485    
          
1,484    
          
1,485    
          
1,484    
                 
Adjusted R-
Square  0.1263   0.1493   0.0979   0.0916   0.1392   
F Value  10.74   12.84   8.31   7.80   11.90   
*, **, and *** denote a difference in coefficients between the first and fifth quintiles with significance of p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 respectively.  50 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 13 
One Year Cumulative Abnormal Returns Following 10-K Release: ETR and CapEx Partitions 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  
Above Mean Effective 
Tax Rate  
Near Mean Effective 
Tax Rate  
Below Mean Effective 
Tax Rate  
No Increase in Capital 
Expenditure  
Increase in Capital 
Expenditures 
  Predicted Sign Estimate Pr > |t|   Estimate Pr > |t|  Estimate Pr > |t|  Estimate Pr > |t|  Estimate Pr > |t| 
Intercept  0.2254 <.0001  0.0551 0.3453  0.3746 <.0001  0.4325 <.0001  0.1780 0.0013 
B100 - -0.1043 0.0002  -0.1695 <.0001  -0.1872 <.0001  -0.1265 <.0001  -0.1628 <.0001 
B50 - -0.1548 <.0001  -0.1585 <.0001  -0.2083 <.0001  -0.2202 <.0001  -0.1384 <.0001 
NetSTK + 0.2393 <.0001  0.2741 <.0001  0.0747 0.3431  0.0565 0.3648  0.2307 <.0001 
ΔCapEx ? -0.1465 0.1377  0.0507 0.6210  -0.0392 0.7808  -0.0541 0.4933  0.6415 0.0048 
ΔCapEx * B100 + -0.0055 0.5706  0.0004 0.8703  -0.0075 0.6659  0.0016 0.5930  -0.0023 0.9791 
ΔCapEx * B50 ? 0.0043 0.6631  0.0042 0.0062  0.0117 0.3780  -0.0027 0.4243  0.0027 0.1001 
OpInc + 0.2101 0.0658  0.2211 0.0574  0.2400 0.0110  0.1126 0.1483  -0.0044 0.9577 
CF - -0.1796 0.0076  -0.0110 0.8737  -0.2438 <.0001  -0.2185 0.0008  -0.2640 <.0001 
TOBINSQ ? -0.0293 <.0001  -0.0372 <.0001  -0.0388 <.0001  -0.0955 <.0001  -0.0317 <.0001 
DivYld + 0.7625 0.1398  0.9413 0.0866  2.2443 0.0011  0.4683 0.3498  2.7888 <.0001 
Size + -0.0068 0.3154  0.0098 0.1593  0.0035 0.7682  -0.0014 0.8386  0.0028 0.6819 
PYCAR + 0.0927 <.0001  0.0619 0.0004  0.1139 <.0001  0.0898 <.0001  0.1091 <.0001 
SPRtn - -3.2868 <.0001  -4.3050 <.0001  -17.7286 <.0001  -9.0426 <.0001  -10.2983 <.0001 
                
Total 
Observations  
          
2,474    
          
2,474    
          
2,474    
          
3,754    
          
3,668   
                
Adjusted R-
Square  0.0667   0.0737   0.1835   0.1192   0.1835  
F Value  9.04   9.94   26.26   24.09   26.26  
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